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Abstrat
Autions are beoming an inreasingly popular method for transating business, espe-
ially over the Internet. This artile presents a general approah to building autonomous
bidding agents to bid in multiple simultaneous autions for interating goods. A ore
omponent of our approah learns a model of the empirial prie dynamis based on past
data and uses the model to analytially alulate, to the greatest extent possible, optimal
bids. We introdue a new and general boosting-based algorithm for onditional density
estimation problems of this kind, i.e., supervised learning problems in whih the goal is to
estimate the entire onditional distribution of the real-valued label. This approah is fully
implemented as ATTa-2001, a top-soring agent in the seond Trading Agent Competition
(TAC-01). We present experiments demonstrating the eetiveness of our boosting-based
prie preditor relative to several reasonable alternatives.
1. Introdution
Autions are an inreasingly popular method for transating business, espeially over the
Internet. In an aution for a single good, it is straightforward to reate automated bidding
strategies|an agent ould keep bidding until reahing a target reserve prie, or it ould
monitor the aution and plae a winning bid just before the losing time (known as sniping).
When bidding for multiple interating goods in simultaneous autions, on the other
hand, agents must be able to reason about unertainty and make omplex value assess-
ments. For example, an agent bidding on one's behalf in separate autions for a amera and
ash may end up buying the ash and then not being able to nd an aordable amera.
Alternatively, if bidding for the same good in several autions, it may purhase two ashes
when only one was needed.
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This artile makes three main ontributions. The rst ontribution is a general ap-
proah to building autonomous bidding agents to bid in multiple simultaneous autions for
interating goods. We start with the observation that the key hallenge in autions is the
predition of eventual pries of goods: with omplete knowledge of eventual pries, there
are diret methods for determining the optimal bids to plae. Our guiding priniple is to
have the agent model its unertainty in eventual pries and, to the greatest extent possible,
analytially alulate optimal bids.
To attak the prie predition problem, we propose a mahine-learning approah: gather
examples of previous autions and the pries paid in them, then use mahine-learning meth-
ods to predit these pries based on available features in the aution. Moreover, for our
strategy, we needed to be able to model the unertainty assoiated with predited pries;
in other words, we needed to be able to sample from a predited distribution of pries
given the urrent state of the game. This an be viewed as a onditional density estimation
problem, that is, a supervised learning problem in whih the goal is to estimate the entire
distribution of a real-valued label given a desription of urrent onditions, typially in the
form of a feature vetor. The seond main ontribution of this artile is a new algorithm
for solving suh general problems based on boosting (Freund & Shapire, 1997; Shapire &
Singer, 1999).
The third ontribution of this artile is a omplete desription of a prototype implemen-
tation of our approah in the form of ATTa-2001, a top-soring agent
1
in the seond Trading
Agent Competition (TAC-01) that was held in Tampa Bay, FL on Otober 14, 2001 (Well-
man, Greenwald, Stone, & Wurman, 2003a). The TAC domain was the main motivation
for the innovations reported here. ATTa-2001 builds on top of ATTa-2000 (Stone, Littman,
Singh, & Kearns, 2001), the top-soring agent at TAC-00, but introdues a fundamentally
new approah to reating autonomous bidding agents.
We present details of ATTa-2001 as an instantiation of its underlying priniples that we
believe have appliations in a wide variety of bidding situations. ATTa-2001 uses a predi-
tive, data-driven approah to bidding based on expeted marginal values of all available
goods. In this artile, we present empirial results demonstrating the robustness and ee-
tiveness of ATTa-2001's adaptive strategy. We also report on ATTa-2001's performane at
TAC-01 and TAC-02 and reet on some of the key issues raised during the ompetitions.
The remainder of the artile is organized as follows. In Setion 2, we present our
general approah to bidding for multiple interating goods in simultaneous autions. In
Setion 3, we summarize TAC, the substrate domain for our work. Setion 4 desribes our
boosting-based prie preditor. In Setion 5, we give the details of ATTa-2001. In Setion 6,
we present empirial results inluding a summary of ATTa-2001's performane in TAC-
01, ontrolled experiments isolating the suessful aspets of ATTa-2001, and ontrolled
experiments illustrating some of the lessons learned during the ompetition. A disussion
and summary of related work is provided in Setions 7 and 8.
2. General Approah
In a wide variety of deision-theoreti settings, it is useful to be able to evaluate hypothetial
situations. In omputer hess, for example, a stati board evaluator is used to heuristially
1. Top-soring by one metri, and seond plae by another.
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measure whih player is ahead and by how muh in a given board situation. The senario
is similar in aution domains, and our bidding agent ATTa-2001 uses a situation evaluator,
analogous to the stati board evaluator, whih estimates the agent's expeted prot in a
hypothetial future situation. This \prot preditor" has a wide variety of uses in the agent.
For example, to determine the value of an item, the agent ompares the predited prot
assuming the item is already owned to the predited prot assuming that the item is not
available.
Given pries for goods, one an often ompute a set of purhases and an alloation that
maximizes prot.
2
Similarly, if losing pries are known, they an be treated as xed, and
optimal bids an be omputed (bid high for anything you want to buy). So, one natural
prot preditor is simply to alulate the prot of optimal purhases under xed predited
pries. (The predited pries an, of ourse, be dierent in dierent situations, e.g., previous
losing pries an be relevant to prediting future losing pries.)
A more sophistiated approah to prot predition is to onstrut a model of the prob-
ability distribution over possible future pries and to plae bids that maximize expeted
prot. An approximate solution to this diÆult optimization problem an be reated by
stohastially sampling possible pries and omputing a prot predition as above for eah
sampled prie. A sampling-based sheme for prot predition is important for modeling
unertainty and the value of gaining information, i.e., reduing the prie unertainty.
Setion 2.1 formalizes this latter approah within a simplied sequential aution model.
This abstration illustrates some of the deision-making issues in our full sampling-based
approah presented in Setion 2.2. The full setting that our approah addresses is onsid-
erably more omplex than the abstrat model, but our simplifying assumptions allow us to
fous on a ore hallenge of the full senario. Our guiding priniple is to make deision-
theoretially optimal deisions given prot preditions for hypothetial future situations.
3
2.1 Simplied Abstration
In the simple model, there are n items to be autioned o in sequene (rst item 0, then
item 1, et.). The bidder must plae a bid r
i
for eah item i, and after eah bid, a losing
prie y
i
is hosen for the orresponding item from a distribution spei to the item. If the
bid mathes or exeeds the losing prie, r
i
 y
i
, the bidder holds item i, h
i
= 1. Otherwise,
the bidder does not hold the item, h
i
= 0. The bidder's utility v(H) is a funtion of its
nal vetor of holdings H = (h
0
; : : : ; h
n 1
) and its ost is a funtion of the holdings and
the vetor of losing pries, H  Y . We will formalize the problem of optimal bid seletion
and develop a series of approximations to make the problem solvable.
2. The problem is omputationally diÆult in general, but has been solved eetively in the non-trivial
TAC setting (Greenwald & Boyan, 2001; Stone et al., 2001).
3. An alternative approah would be to abstratly alulate the Bayes-Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1968)
for the game and play the optimal strategy. We dismissed this approah beause of its intratability in
realistially omplex situations, inluding TAC. Furthermore, even if we were able to approximate the
equilibrium strategy, it is reasonable to assume that our opponents would not play optimal strategies.
Thus, we ould gain additional advantage by tuning our approah to our opponents' atual behavior as
observed in the earlier rounds, whih is essentially the strategy we adopted.
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2.1.1 Exat Value
What is the value of the aution, that is, the bidder's expeted prot (utility minus ost)
for bidding optimally for the rest of the aution? If a bidder knows this value, it an make
its next bid to be one that maximizes its expeted prot. The value is a funtion of the
bidder's urrent holdings H and the urrent item to bid on, i. It an be expressed as
value(i;H) = max
r
i
E
y
i
max
r
i+1
E
y
i+1
: : :max
r
n 1
E
y
n 1
(v(G+H) G  Y ); (1)
where the omponents of G are the new holdings as a result of additional winnings g
j

r
j
 y
j
. Note that H only has non-zero entries for items that have already been sold
(8j  i;H
j
= 0) and G only has non-zero entries for items that have yet to be sold
(8j < i;G
j
= 0). Note also that G and Y are fully speied when the g
j
and y
j
variables
(for j  i) are bound sequentially by the expetation and maximization operators. The
idea here is that the bids r
i
through r
n 1
are hosen to maximize value in the ontext of
the possible losing pries y
j
.
Equation 1 is losely related to the equations dening the value of a nite-horizon par-
tially observable Markov deision proess (Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987) or a stohasti
satisability expression (Littman, Majerik, & Pitassi, 2001). Like these other problems,
the sequential aution problem is omputationally intratable for suÆiently general repre-
sentations of v() (speially, linear funtions of the holdings are not expressive enough to
ahieve intratability while arbitrary nonlinear funtions are).
2.1.2 Approximate Value by Reordering
There are three major soures of intratability in Equation 1|the alternation of the maxi-
mization and expetation operators (allowing deisions to be onditioned on an exponential
number of possible sets of holdings), the large number of maximizations (foring an ex-
ponential number of deisions to be onsidered), and the large number of expetations
(resulting in sums over an exponential number of variable settings).
We attak the problem of interleaved operators by moving all but the rst of the maxi-
mizations inside the expetations, resulting in an expression that approximates the value:
value-est(i;H) = max
r
i
E
y
i
E
y
i+1
: : : E
y
n 1
max
r
i+1
: : :max
r
n 1
(v(G+H) G  Y ): (2)
Beause the hoies for bids r
i+1
through r
n 1
appear more deeply nested than the bindings
for the losing pries y
i
through y
n 1
, they ease to be bids altogether, and instead represent
deisions as to whether to purhase goods at given pries. Let G = opt(H; i; Y ) be a vetor
representing the optimal number of goods to purhase at the pries speied by the vetor
Y given the urrent holdingsH starting from aution i. Coneptually, this an be omputed
by evaluating
opt(H; i; Y ) = argmax
g
i
;:::;g
n 1
(v(G+H) H  Y ): (3)
Thus, Equation 2 an be written:
value-est(i;H) = max
r
i
E
y
i
;:::;y
n 1
(v(opt(H
0
; i+ 1; Y ) +H
0
)  opt(H
0
; i+ 1; Y )  Y ) (4)
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whereH
0
is idential to H exept the i-th omponent reets whether item i is won|r
i
 y
i
.
Note that there is a further approximation that an be made by omputing the expeted
pries (as point values) before solving the optimization problem. This approah orresponds
to further swapping the expetations towards the ore of the equation:
value-est(i;H)
ev
= max
r
i
(v(opt(H
0
; i+ 1; E
Y
) +H
0
)  opt(H
0
; i+ 1; E
Y
)  E
Y
) (5)
where E
Y
= E[y
i+1
; : : : ; y
n 1
℄, the vetor of expeted osts of the goods. In the remainder
of the artile, we refer to methods that use this further approximation from Equation 5 as
expeted value approahes for reasons that will be ome apparent shortly.
The tehnique of swapping maximization and expetation operators was previously used
by Hauskreht (1997) to generate a bound for solving partially observable Markov deision
proesses. The derease of unertainty when deisions are made makes this approximation
an upper bound on the true value of the aution: value-est  value. The tightness of the ap-
proximations in Equations 2 and 5 depends on the true distributions of the expeted pries.
For example, if the pries were known in advane with ertainty, then both approximations
are exat.
2.1.3 Approximate Bidding
Given a vetor of osts Y , the optimization problem opt(H; i; Y ) in Equation 4 is still NP-
hard (assuming the representation of the utility funtion v() is suÆiently omplex). For
many representations of v(), the optimization problem an be ast as an integer linear pro-
gram and approximated by using the frational relaxation instead of the exat optimization
problem. This is preisely the approah we have adopted in ATTa (Stone et al., 2001).
2.1.4 Approximation via Sampling
Even assuming that opt(H; i; Y ) an be solved in unit time, a literal interpretation of Equa-
tion 4 says we'll need to solve this optimization problem for an exponential number of ost
vetors (or even more if the probability distributions Pr(y
j
) are ontinuous). Kearns, Man-
sour, and Ng (1999) showed that values of partially observable Markov deision proesses
ould be estimated aurately by sampling trajetories instead of exatly omputing sums.
Littman et al. (2001) did the same for stohasti satisability expressions. Applying this
idea to Equation 4 leads to the following algorithm.
1. Generate a set S of vetors of losing osts Y aording to the produt distribution
Pr(y
i
)     Pr(y
n 1
).
2. For eah of these samples, alulate opt(H
0
; i+1; Y ) as dened above and average the
results, resulting in the approximation
value-est
s
(i;H) = max
r
i
X
Y 2S
(v(opt(H
0
; i+1; Y ) +H
0
)  opt(H
0
; i+1; Y )  Y )=jSj: (6)
This expression onverges to value-est with inreasing sample size.
A remaining hallenge in evaluating Equation 6 is omputing the real-valued bid r
i
that
maximizes the value. Note that we want to buy item i preisely at those losing pries for
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whih the value of having the item (minus its ost) exeeds the value of not having the item;
this maximizes prot. Thus, to make a positive prot, we are willing to pay up to, but not
more than, the dierene in value of having the item and not having the item.
Formally, let H be the vetor of urrent holdings and H
w
be the holdings modied to
reet winning item i. Let G
w
(Y ) = opt(H
w
; i+1; Y ), the optimal set of purhases assuming
item i was won, andG(Y ) = opt(H; i+1; Y ) the optimal set of purhases assuming otherwise
(exept in ases of ambiguity, we write simply G
w
and G for G
w
(Y ) and G(Y ) respetively).
We want to selet r
i
to ahieve the equivalene
r
i
 y
i

X
Y 2S
(v(G
w
+H) G
w
 Y )=jSj   y
i

X
Y 2S
(v(G+H) G  Y )=jSj: (7)
Setting
r
i
=
X
Y 2S
([v(G
w
+H) G
w
 Y ℄  [v(G+H) G  Y ℄)=jSj: (8)
ahieves the equivalene desired in Equation 7, as an be veried by substitution, and
therefore bidding the average dierene between holding and not holding the item maximizes
the value.
4
2.2 The Full Approah
Leveraging from the preeding analysis, we dene our sampling-based approah to prot
predition in general simultaneous, multi-unit autions for interating goods. In this se-
nario, let there be n simultaneous, multi-unit autions for interating goods a
0
; : : : ; a
n 1
.
The autions might lose at dierent times and these times are not, in general, known in
advane to the bidders. When an aution loses, let us assume that the m units available
are distributed irrevoably to the m highest bidders, who eah need to pay the prie bid
by the mth highest bidder. This senario orresponds to an mth prie asending aution.
5
Note that the same bidder may plae multiple bids in an aution, and thereby potentially
win multiple units. We assume that after the aution loses, the bidders will no longer have
any opportunity to aquire additional opies of the goods sold in that aution (i.e., there
is no aftermarket).
Our approah is based upon ve assumptions. For G = (g
0
; : : : ; g
n 1
) 2 IN
n
, let v(G) 2 IR
represent the value derived by the agent if it owns g
i
units of the ommodity being sold in
aution a
i
. Note that v is independent of the osts of the ommodities. Note further that
this representation allows for interating goods of all kinds, inluding omplementarity and
substitutability.
6
The assumptions of our approah are as follows:
1. Closing pries are somewhat, but only somewhat, preditable. That is, given a set
of input features X, for eah aution a
i
, there exists a sampling rule that outputs a
4. Note that the strategy for hoosing r
i
in Equation 8 does not exploit the fat that the sample S ontains
only a nite set of possibilities for y
i
, whih might make it more robust to inauraies in the sampling.
5. For large enough m it is pratially the same as the more eÆient m + 1st aution. We use the mth
prie model beause that is what is used in TAC's hotel autions.
6. Goods are onsidered omplementary if their value as a pakage is greater than the sum of their individual
values; goods are onsidered substitutable if their value as a pakage is less than the sum of their
individual values.
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losing prie y
i
aording to a probability distribution of predited losing pries for
a
i
.
2. Given a vetor of holdings H = (h
0
; : : : ; h
n 1
) where h
i
2 IN represents the quantity
of the ommodity being sold in aution a
i
that are already owned by the agent, and
given a vetor of xed losing pries Y = (y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
), there exists a tratable
proedure opt(H;Y ) to determine the optimal set of purhases (g
0
; : : : ; g
n 1
) where
g
i
2 IN represents the number of goods to be purhased in aution i suh that
v(opt(H;Y ) +H)  opt(H;Y )  Y  v(G+H) G  Y
for all G 2 IN
n
. This proedure orresponds to the optimization problem opt(H; i; Y )
in Equation 3.
3. An individual agent's bids do not have an appreiable eet on the eonomy (large
population assumption).
4. The agent is free to hange existing bids in autions that have not yet losed.
5. Future deisions are made in the presene of omplete prie information. This as-
sumption orresponds to the operator reordering approximation from the previous
setion.
While these assumptions are not all true in general, they an be reasonable enough approx-
imations to be the basis for an eetive strategy.
By Assumption 3, the prie preditor an generate predited pries prior to onsidering
one's bids. Thus, we an sample from these distributions to produe omplete sets of losing
pries of all goods.
For eah good under onsideration, we assume that it is the next one to lose. If a
dierent aution loses rst, we an then revise our bids later (Assumption 4). Thus, we
would like to bid exatly the good's expeted marginal utility to us. That is, we bid the
dierene between the expeted utilities attainable with and without the good. To ompute
these expetations, we simply average the utilities of having and not having the good under
dierent prie samples as in Equation 8. This strategy rests on Assumption 5 in that we
assume that bidding the good's urrent expeted marginal utility annot adversely aet
our future ations, for instane by impating our future spae of possible bids. Note that as
time proeeds, the prie distributions hange in response to the observed prie trajetories,
thus ausing the agent to ontinually revise its bids.
Table 1 shows pseudo-ode for the entire algorithm. A fully detailed desription of an
instantiation of this approah is given in Setion 5.
2.3 Example
Consider a amera and a ash with interating values to an agent as shown in Table 2.
Further, onsider that the agent estimates that the amera will sell for $40 with probability
25%, $70 with probability 50%, and $95 with probability 25%. Consider the question of
what the agent should bid for the ash (in aution a
0
). The deision pertaining to the
amera would be made via a similar analysis.
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 Let H = (h
0
; : : : ; h
n 1
) be the agent's urrent holdings in eah of the n autions.
 For i = 0 to n  1 (assume aution i is next to lose):
{ total-di = 0
{ ounter = 0
{ As time permits:
 For eah aution a
j
; j 6= i, generate a predited prie sample y
j
. Let Y =
(y
0
; : : : ; y
i 1
;1; y
i+1
; : : : ; y
n 1
).
 Let H
w
= (h
0
; : : : ; h
i 1
; h
i
+ 1; h
i+1
; : : : ; h
n 1
), the vetor of holdings if the agent
wins a unit in aution a
i
.
 Compute G
w
= opt(H
w
; Y ), the optimal set of purhases if the agent wins a unit in
aution a
i
. Note that no additional units of the good will be purhased, sine the
i-th omponent of Y is 1.
 Compute G = opt(H;Y ), the optimal set of purhases if the agent never aquires
any additional units in the aution a
i
and pries are set to Y .
 di = [v(G
w
+H) G
w
 Y ℄  [v(G +H) G  Y ℄
 total-di = total-di + di
 ounter = ounter + 1
{ r = total-di=ounter
{ Bid r in aution a
i
.
Table 1: The deision-theoreti algorithm for bidding in simultaneous, multi-unit, interat-
ing autions.
utility
amera alone $50
ash alone 10
both 100
neither 0
Table 2: The table of values for all ombination of amera and ash in our example.
First, the agent samples from the distribution of possible amera pries. When the prie
of the amera (sold in aution a
1
) is $70 in the sample:
 H = (0; 0);H
w
= (1; 0); Y = (1; 70)
 G
w
= opt(H
w
; Y ) is the best set of purhases the agent an make with the ash, and
assuming the amera osts $70. In this ase, the only two options are buying the
amera or not. Buying the amera yields a prot of 100   70 = 30. Not buying the
amera yields a prot of 10  0 = 10. Thus, G
w
= (0; 1), and [v(G
w
+H) G
w
 Y ℄ =
v(1; 1)   (0; 1)  (1; 70) = 100  70.
 SimilarlyG = (0; 0) (sine if the ash is not owned, buying the amera yields a prot of
50 70 =  20, and not buying it yields a prot of 0 0 = 0) and [v(G+H) GY ℄ = 0.
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 val = 30  0 = 30.
Similarly, when the amera is predited to ost $40, val = 60 10 = 50; and when the amera
is predited to ost $95, val = 10  0 = 10. Thus, we expet that 50% of the amera prie
samples will suggest a ash value of $30, while 25% will lead to a value of $50 and the other
25% will lead to a value of $10. Thus, the agent will bid :5 30+ :25 50+ :25 10 = $30
for the ash.
Notie that in this analysis of what to bid for the ash, the atual losing prie of
the ash is irrelevant. The proper bid depends only on the predited prie of the amera.
To determine the proper bid for the amera, a similar analysis would be done using the
predited prie distribution of the ash.
3. TAC
We instantiated our approah as an entry in the seond Trading Agent Competition (TAC),
as desribed in this setion. Building on the suess of TAC-00 held in July 2000 (Wellman,
Wurman, O'Malley, Bangera, Lin, Reeves, & Walsh, 2001), TAC-01 inluded 19 agents from
9 ountries (Wellman et al., 2003a). A key feature of TAC is that it required autonomous
bidding agents to buy and sell multiple interating goods in autions of dierent types. It
is designed as a benhmark problem in the omplex and rapidly advaning domain of e-
marketplaes, motivating researhers to apply unique approahes to a ommon task. By
providing a lear-ut objetive funtion, TAC also allows the ompetitors to fous their
attention on the omputational and game-theoreti aspets of the problem and leave aside
the modeling and model validation issues that invariably loom large in real appliations of
automated agents to autions (see Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). Another feature of TAC
is that it provides an aademi forum for open omparison of agent bidding strategies in
a omplex senario, as opposed to other omplex senarios, suh as trading in real stok
markets, in whih pratitioners are (understandably) relutant to share their tehnologies.
A TAC game instane pits eight autonomous bidding agents against one another. Eah
TAC agent is a simulated travel agent with eight lients, eah of whom would like to travel
from TACtown to Tampa and bak again during a 5-day period. Eah lient is haraterized
by a random set of preferenes for the possible arrival and departure dates, hotel rooms, and
entertainment tikets. To satisfy a lient, an agent must onstrut a travel pakage for that
lient by purhasing airline tikets to and from TACtown and seuring hotel reservations; it
is possible to obtain additional bonuses by providing entertainment tikets as well. A TAC
agent's sore in a game instane is the dierene between the sum of its lients' utilities for
the pakages they reeive and the agent's total expenditure. We provide seleted details
about the game next; for full details on the design and mehanisms of the TAC server and
TAC game, see http://www.sis.se/ta.
TAC agents buy ights, hotel rooms and entertainment tikets through autions run
from the TAC server at the University of Mihigan. Eah game instane lasts 12 minutes
and inludes a total of 28 autions of 3 dierent types.
Flights (8 autions): There is a separate aution for eah type of airline tiket: to Tampa
(inights) on days 1{4 and from Tampa (outights) on days 2{5. There is an unlimited
supply of airline tikets, and every 24{32 seonds their ask prie hanges by from  $10
217
Stone, Shapire, Littman, Csirik, & MAllester
to $x. x inreases linearly over the ourse of a game from 10 to y, where y 2 [10; 90℄
is hosen uniformly at random for eah aution, and is unknown to the bidders. In
all ases, tikets are pried between $150 and $800. When the server reeives a bid at
or above the ask prie, the transation is leared immediately at the ask prie and no
resale is allowed.
Hotel Rooms (8): There are two dierent types of hotel rooms|the Tampa Towers (TT)
and the Shoreline Shanties (SS)|eah of whih has 16 rooms available on days 1{4.
The rooms are sold in a 16th-prie asending (English) aution, meaning that for eah
of the 8 types of hotel rooms, the 16 highest bidders get the rooms at the 16th highest
prie. For example, if there are 15 bids for TT on day 2 at $300, 2 bids at $150, and
any number of lower bids, the rooms are sold for $150 to the 15 high bidders plus
one of the $150 bidders (earliest reeived bid). The ask prie is the urrent 16th-
highest bid and transations lear only when the aution loses. Thus, agents have
no knowledge of, for example, the urrent highest bid. New bids must be higher than
the urrent ask prie. No bid withdrawal or resale is allowed, though the prie of bids
may be lowered provided the agent does not redue the number of rooms it would win
were the aution to lose. One randomly hosen hotel aution loses at minutes 4{11
of the 12-minute game. Ask pries are hanged only on the minute.
Entertainment Tikets (12): Alligator wrestling, amusement park, and museum tikets
are eah sold for days 1{4 in ontinuous double autions. Here, agents an buy and
sell tikets, with transations learing immediately when one agent plaes a buy bid
at a prie at least as high as another agent's sell prie. Unlike the other aution
types in whih the goods are sold from a entralized stok, eah agent starts with a
(skewed) random endowment of entertainment tikets. The pries sent to agents are
the bid-ask spreads, i.e., the highest urrent bid prie and the lowest urrent ask prie
(due to immediate lears, ask prie is always greater than bid prie). In this ase, bid
withdrawal and tiket resale are both permitted. Eah agent gets bloks of 4 tikets
of 2 types, 2 tikets of another 2 types, and no tikets of the other 8 types.
In addition to unpreditable market pries, other soures of variability from game in-
stane to game instane are the lient proles assigned to the agents and the random initial
allotment of entertainment tikets. Eah TAC agent has eight lients with randomly as-
signed travel preferenes. Clients have parameters for ideal arrival day, IAD (1{4); ideal
departure day, IDD (2{5); hotel premium, HP ($50{$150); and entertainment values, EV
($0{$200) for eah type of entertainment tiket.
The utility obtained by a lient is determined by the travel pakage that it is given in
ombination with its preferenes. To obtain a non-zero utility, the lient must be assigned
a feasible travel pakage onsisting of an inight on some arrival day AD, an outight on a
departure day DD, and hotel rooms of the same type (TT or SS) for the days in between
(days d suh that AD  d < DD). At most one entertainment tiket of eah type an be
assigned, and no more than one on eah day. Given a feasible pakage, the lient's utility
is dened as
1000   travelPenalty + hotelBonus + funBonus
where
218
Deision-Theoreti Bidding with Learned Density Models
 travelPenalty = 100(jAD   IAD j+ jDD   IDDj)
 hotelBonus = HP if the lient is in the TT, 0 otherwise.
 funBonus = sum of EVs for assigned entertainment tikets.
A TAC agent's sore is the sum of its lients' utilities in the optimal alloation of
its goods (omputed by the TAC server) minus its expenditures. The lient preferenes,
alloations, and resulting utilities from a sample game are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Client IAD IDD HP AW AP MU
1 Day 2 Day 5 73 175 34 24
2 Day 1 Day 3 125 113 124 57
3 Day 4 Day 5 73 157 12 177
4 Day 1 Day 2 102 50 67 49
5 Day 1 Day 3 75 12 135 110
6 Day 2 Day 4 86 197 8 59
7 Day 1 Day 5 90 56 197 162
8 Day 1 Day 3 50 79 92 136
Table 3: ATTa-2001's lient preferenes from an atual game. AW, AP, and MU are EVs
for alligator wrestling, amusement park, and museum respetively.
Client AD DD Hotel Ent'ment Utility
1 Day 2 Day 5 SS AW4 1175
2 Day 1 Day 2 TT AW1 1138
3 Day 3 Day 5 SS MU3, AW4 1234
4 Day 1 Day 2 TT None 1102
5 Day 1 Day 2 TT AP1 1110
6 Day 2 Day 3 TT AW2 1183
7 Day 1 Day 5 SS AF2, AW3, MU4 1415
8 Day 1 Day 2 TT MU1 1086
Table 4: ATTa-2001's lient alloations and utilities from the same atual game as that in
Table 3. Client 1's \4" under \Ent'ment" indiates on day 4.
The rules of TAC-01 are largely idential to those of TAC-00, with three important
exeptions:
1. In TAC-00, ight pries did not tend to inrease;
2. In TAC-00, hotel autions usually all losed at the end of the game;
3. In TAC-00, entertainment tikets were distributed uniformly to all agents
While relatively minor on the surfae, these hanges signiantly enrihed the strategi
omplexity of the game. Stone and Greenwald (2003) detail agent strategies from TAC-00.
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TAC-01 was organized as a series of four ompetition phases, ulminating with the
seminals and nals on Otober 14, 2001 at the EC-01 onferene in Tampa, Florida. First,
the qualifying round, onsisting of about 270 games per agent, served to selet the 16
agents that would partiipate in the seminals. Seond, the seeding round, onsisting of
about 315 games per agent, was used to divide these agents into two groups of eight. After
the seminals, on the morning of the 14th onsisting of 11 games in eah group, four teams
from eah group were seleted to ompete in the nals during that same afternoon. The
nals are summarized in Setion 6.
TAC is not designed to be fully realisti in the sense that an agent from TAC is not
immediately deployable in the real world. For one thing, it is unrealisti to assume that an
agent would have omplete, reliable aess to all lients' utility funtions (or even that the
lient would!); typially, some sort of preferene eliitation proedure would be required (e.g.
Boutilier, 2002). For another, the aution mehanisms are somewhat ontrived for the
purposes of reating an interesting, yet relatively simple game. However, eah mehanism
is representative of a lass of autions that is used in the real world. And it is not diÆult
to imagine a future in whih agents do need to bid in deentralized, related, yet varying
autions for similarly omplex pakages of goods.
4. Hotel Prie Predition
As disussed earlier, a entral part of our strategy depends on the ability to predit pries,
partiularly hotel pries, at various points in the game. To do this as aurately as possible,
we used mahine-learning tehniques that would examine the hotel pries atually paid
in previous games to predit pries in future games. This setion disusses this part of
our strategy in detail, inluding a new boosting-based algorithm for onditional density
estimation.
There is bound to be onsiderable unertainty regarding hotel pries sine these depend
on many unknown fators, suh as the time at whih the hotel room will lose, who the
other agents are, what kind of lients have been assigned to eah agent, et. Thus, exatly
prediting the prie of a hotel room is hopeless. Instead, we regard the losing prie as a
random variable that we need to estimate, onditional on our urrent state of knowledge
(i.e., number of minutes remaining in the game, ask prie of eah hotel, ight pries, et.).
We might then attempt to predit this variable's onditional expeted value. However,
our strategy requires that we not only predit expeted value, but that we also be able to
estimate the entire onditional distribution so that we an sample hotel pries.
To set this up as a learning problem, we gathered a set of training examples from
previously played games. We dened a set of features for desribing eah example that
together are meant to omprise a snap-shot of all the relevant information available at the
time eah predition is made. All of the features we used are real valued; a ouple of the
features an have a speial value ? indiating \value unknown." We used the following
basi features:
 The number of minutes remaining in the game.
 The prie of eah hotel room, i.e., the urrent ask prie for rooms that have not losed
or the atual selling prie for rooms that have losed.
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 The losing time of eah hotel room. Note that this feature is dened even for rooms
that have not yet losed, as explained below.
 The pries of eah of the ights.
To this basi list, we added a number of redundant variations, whih we thought might help
the learning algorithm:
 The losing prie of hotel rooms that have losed (or ? if the room has not yet losed).
 The urrent ask prie of hotel rooms that have not losed (or ? if the room has already
losed).
 The losing time of eah hotel room minus the losing time of the room whose prie
we are trying to predit.
 The number of minutes from the urrent time until eah hotel room loses.
During the seeding rounds, it was impossible to know during play who our opponents
were, although this information was available at the end of eah game, and therefore during
training. During the seminals and nals, we did know the identities of all our ompetitors.
Therefore, in preparation for the seminals and nals, we added the following features:
 The number of players playing (ordinarily eight, but sometimes fewer, for instane if
one or more players rashed).
 A bit for eah player indiating whether or not that player partiipated in this game.
We trained speialized preditors for prediting the prie of eah type of hotel room.
In other words, one preditor was speialized for prediting only the prie of TT on day
1, another for prediting SS on day 2, et. This would seem to require eight separate
preditors. However, the tournament game is naturally symmetri about its middle in the
sense that we an reate an equivalent game by exhanging the hotel rooms on days 1 and
2 with those on days 4 and 3 (respetively), and by exhanging the inbound ights on
days 1, 2, 3 and 4 with the outbound ights on days 5, 4, 3 and 2 (respetively). Thus,
with appropriate transformations, the outer days (1 and 4) an be treated equivalently, and
likewise for the inner days (2 and 3), reduing the number of speialized preditors by half.
We also reated speialized preditors for prediting in the rst minute after ight pries
had been quoted but prior to reeiving any hotel prie information. Thus, a total of eight
speialized preditors were built (for eah ombination of TT versus SS, inner versus outer
day, and rst minute versus not rst minute).
We trained our preditors to predit not the atual losing prie of eah room per se,
but rather how muh the prie would inrease, i.e., the dierene between the losing prie
and the urrent prie. We thought that this might be an easier quantity to predit, and,
beause our preditor never outputs a negative number when trained on nonnegative data,
this approah also ensures that we never predit a losing prie below the urrent bid.
From eah of the previously played games, we were able to extrat many examples.
Speially, for eah minute of the game and for eah room that had not yet losed, we
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extrated the values of all of the features desribed above at that moment in the game, plus
the atual losing prie of the room (whih we are trying to predit).
Note that during training, there is no problem extrating the losing times of all of the
rooms. During the atual play of a game, we do not know the losing times of rooms that
have not yet losed. However, we do know the exat probability distribution for losing
times of all of the rooms that have not yet losed. Therefore, to sample a vetor of hotel
pries, we an rst sample aording to this distribution over losing times, and then use
our preditor to sample hotel pries using these sampled losing times.
4.1 The Learning Algorithm
Having desribed how we set up the learning problem, we are now ready to desribe the
learning algorithm that we used. Briey, we solved this learning problem by rst reduing to
a multilass, multi-label lassiation problem (or alternatively a multiple logisti regression
problem), and then applying boosting tehniques developed by Shapire and Singer (1999,
2000) ombined with a modiation of boosting algorithms for logisti regression proposed
by Collins, Shapire and Singer (2002). The result is a new mahine-learning algorithm for
solving onditional density estimation problems, desribed in detail in the remainder of this
setion. Table 5 shows pseudo-ode for the entire algorithm.
Abstratly, we are given pairs (x
1
; y
1
); : : : ; (x
m
; y
m
) where eah x
i
belongs to a spae X
and eah y
i
is in R. In our ase, the x
i
's are the aution-spei feature vetors desribed
above; for some n, X  (R[f?g)
n
. Eah target quantity y
i
is the dierene between losing
prie and urrent prie. Given a new x, our goal is to estimate the onditional distribution
of y given x.
We proeed with the working assumption that all training and test examples (x; y) are
i.i.d. (i.e, drawn independently from idential distributions). Although this assumption is
false in our ase (sine the agents, inluding ours, are hanging over time), it seems like a
reasonable approximation that greatly redues the diÆulty of the learning task.
Our rst step is to redue the estimation problem to a lassiation problem by breaking
the range of the y
i
's into bins:
[b
0
; b
1
); [b
1
; b
2
); : : : ; [b
k
; b
k+1
℄
for some breakpoints b
0
< b
1
<    < b
k
 b
k+1
where for our problem, we hose k = 50.
7
The endpoints b
0
and b
k+1
are hosen to be the smallest and largest y
i
values observed
during training. We hoose the remaining breakpoints b
1
; : : : ; b
k
so that roughly an equal
number of training labels y
i
fall into eah bin. (More tehnially, breakpoints are hosen so
that the entropy of the distribution of bin frequenies is maximized.)
For eah of the breakpoints b
j
(j = 1; : : : ; k), our learning algorithm attempts to estimate
the probability that a new y (given x) will be at least b
j
. Given suh estimates p
j
for eah
b
j
, we an then estimate the probability that y is in the bin [b
j
; b
j+1
) by p
j+1
  p
j
(and
we an then use a onstant density within eah bin). We thus have redued the problem
to one of estimating multiple onditional Bernoulli variables orresponding to the event
7. We did not experiment with varying k, but expet that the algorithm is not sensitive to it for suÆiently
large values of k.
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Input: (x
1
; y
1
); : : : ; (x
m
; y
m
) where x
i
2 X , y
i
2 R
positive integers k and T
Compute breakpoints: b
0
< b
1
<    < b
k+1
where
 b
0
= min
i
y
i
 b
k+1
= max
i
y
i
 b
1
; : : : ; b
k
hosen to minimize
P
k
j=0
q
j
ln q
j
where q
0
; : : : ; q
k
are fration of y
i
's in
[b
0
; b
1
); [b
1
; b
2
); : : : ; [b
k
; b
k+1
℄ (using dynami programing)
Boosting:
 for t = 1; : : : T :
  ompute weights W
t
(i; j) =
1
1 + e
s
j
(y
i
)f
t
(x
i
;j)
where s
j
(y) is as in Eq. (10)
  use W
t
to obtain base funtion h
t
: X  f1; : : : ; kg ! R minimizing
m
X
i=1
k
X
j=1
W
t
(i; j)e
 s
j
(y
i
)h
t
(x
i
;j)
over all deision rules h
t
onsidered. The deision rules
an take any form. In our work, we use \deision stumps," or simple thresholds on one
of the features.
Output sampling rule:
 let f =
T
X
t=1
h
t
 let f
0
= (f + f)=2 where
f(x; j) = maxff(x; j
0
) : j  j
0
 kg
f(x; j) = minff(x; j
0
) : 1  j
0
 jg
 to sample, given x 2 X
  let p
j
=
1
1 + e
 f
0
(x;j)
  let p
0
= 1; p
k+1
= 0
  hoose j 2 f0; : : : ; kg randomly with probability p
j
  p
j+1
  hoose y uniformly at random from [b
j
; b
j+1
℄
  output y
Table 5: The boosting-based algorithm for onditional density estimation.
y  b
j
, and for this, we use a logisti regression algorithm based on boosting tehniques as
desribed by Collins et al. (2002).
Our learning algorithm onstruts a real-valued funtion f : X  f1; : : : ; kg ! R with
the interpretation that
1
1 + exp( f(x; j))
(9)
is our estimate of the probability that y  b
j
, given x. The negative log likelihood of the
onditional Bernoulli variable orresponding to y
i
being above or below b
j
is then
ln

1 + e
 s
j
(y
i
)f(x
i
;j)

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where
s
j
(y) =
(
+1 if y  b
j
 1 if y < b
j
.
(10)
We attempt to minimize this quantity for all training examples (x
i
; y
i
) and all break-
points b
j
. Speially, we try to nd a funtion f minimizing
m
X
i=1
k
X
j=1
ln

1 + e
 s
j
(y
i
)f(x
i
;j)

:
We use a boosting-like algorithm desribed by Collins et al. (2002) for minimizing objetive
funtions of exatly this form. Speially, we build the funtion f in rounds. On eah
round t, we add a new base funtion h
t
: X  f1; : : : ; kg ! R. Let
f
t
=
t 1
X
t
0
=1
h
t
0
be the aumulating sum. Following Collins, Shapire and Singer, to onstrut eah h
t
, we
rst let
W
t
(i; j) =
1
1 + e
s
j
(y
i
)f
t
(x
i
;j)
be a set of weights on example-breakpoint pairs. We then hoose h
t
to minimize
m
X
i=1
k
X
j=1
W
t
(i; j)e
 s
j
(y
i
)h
t
(x
i
;j)
(11)
over some spae of \simple" base funtions h
t
. For this work, we onsidered all \deision
stumps" h of the form
h(x; j) =
8
>
<
>
:
A
j
if (x)  
B
j
if (x) < 
C
j
if (x) =?
where () is one of the features desribed above, and , A
j
, B
j
and C
j
are all real numbers.
In other words, suh an h simply ompares one feature  to a threshold  and returns a
vetor of numbers h(x; ) that depends only on whether (x) is unknown (?), or above
or below . Shapire and Singer (2000) show how to eÆiently searh for the best suh
h over all possible hoies of , , A
j
, B
j
and C
j
. (We also employed their tehnique for
\smoothing" A
j
, B
j
and C
j
.)
When omputed by this sort of iterative proedure, Collins et al. (2002) prove the
asymptoti onvergene of f
t
to the minimum of the objetive funtion in Equation (11)
over all linear ombinations of the base funtions. For this problem, we xed the number
of rounds to T = 300. Let f = f
T+1
be the nal preditor.
As noted above, given a new feature vetor x, we ompute p
j
as in Equation (9) to be
our estimate for the probability that y  b
j
, and we let p
0
= 1 and p
k+1
= 0. For this to
make sense, we need p
1
 p
2
     p
k
, or equivalently, f(x; 1)  f(x; 2)      f(x; k), a
ondition that may not hold for the learned funtion f . To fore this ondition, we replae
f by a reasonable (albeit heuristi) approximation f
0
that is noninreasing in j, namely,
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f
0
= (f+f)=2 where f (respetively, f) is the pointwise minimum (respetively, maximum)
of all noninreasing funtions g that everywhere upper bound f (respetively, lower bound
f).
With this modied funtion f
0
, we an ompute modied probabilities p
j
. To sample
a single point aording to the estimated distribution on R assoiated with f
0
, we hoose
bin [b
j
; b
j+1
) with probability p
j
  p
j+1
, and then selet a point from this bin uniformly at
random. Expeted value aording to this distribution is easily omputed as
k
X
j=0
(p
j
  p
j+1
)

b
j+1
+ b
j
2

:
Although we present results using this algorithm in the trading agent ontext, we did
not test its performane on more general learning problems, nor did we ompare to other
methods for onditional density estimation, suh as those studied by Stone (1994). This
learly should be an area for future researh.
5. ATTa-2001
Having desribed hotel prie predition in detail, we now present the remaining details of
ATTa-2001's algorithm. We begin with a brief desription of the goods alloator, whih
is used as a subroutine throughout the algorithm. We then present the algorithm in a
top-down fashion.
5.1 Starting Point
A ore subproblem for TAC agents is the alloation problem: nding the most protable
alloation of goods to lients, G

, given a set of owned goods and pries for all other goods.
The alloation problem orresponds to nding opt(H; i; Y ) in Equation 3. We denote the
value of G

(i.e., the sore one would attain with G

) as v(G

). The general alloation
problem is NP-omplete, as it is equivalent to the set-paking problem (Garey & Johnson,
1979). However it an be solved tratably in TAC via integer linear programming (Stone
et al., 2001).
The solution to the integer linear program is a value-maximizing alloation of owned
resoures to lients along with a list of resoures that need to be purhased. Using the linear
programming pakage \LPsolve", ATTa-2001 is usually able to nd the globally optimal
solution in under 0.01 seonds on a 650 MHz Pentium II. However, sine integer linear
programming is an NP-omplete problem, some inputs an lead to a great deal of searh
over the integrality onstraints, and therefore signiantly longer solution times. When only
v(G

) is needed (as opposed to G

itself), the upper bound produed by LPsolve prior to
the searh over the integrality onstraints, known as the LP relaxation, an be used as an
estimate. The LP relaxation an always be generated very quikly.
Note that this is not by any means the only possible formulation of the alloation
problem. Greenwald and Boyan (2001) studied a fast, heuristi searh variant and found
that it performed extremely well on a olletion of large, random alloation problems. Stone
et al. (2001) used a randomized greedy strategy as a fallbak for the ases in whih the linear
program took too long to solve.
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5.2 Overview
Table 6 shows a high-level overview of ATTa-2001. The italiized portions are desribed in
the remainder of this setion.
When the rst ight quotes are posted:
 Compute G

with urrent holdings and expeted pries
 Buy the ights in G

for whih expeted ost of postponing ommitment exeeds the expeted
benet of postponing ommitment
Starting 1 minute before eah hotel lose:
 Compute G

with urrent holdings and expeted pries
 Buy the ights in G

for whih expeted ost of postponing ommitment exeeds expeted
benet of postponing ommitment (30 seonds)
 Bid hotel room expeted marginal values given holdings, new ights, and expeted hotel
purhases (30 seonds)
Last minute: Buy remaining ights as needed by G

In parallel (ontinuously): Buy/sell entertainment tikets based on their expeted values
Table 6: ATTa-2001's high-level algorithm. The italiized portions are desribed in the
remainder of this setion.
5.3 Cost of Additional Rooms
Our hotel prie preditor desribed in Setion 4 assumes that ATTa-2001's bids do not aet
the ultimate losing prie (Assumption 3 from Setion 2). This assumption holds in a large
eonomy. However in TAC, eah hotel aution involved 8 agents ompeting for 16 hotel
rooms. Therefore, the ations of eah agent had an appreiable eet on the learing prie:
the more hotel rooms an agent attempted to purhase, the higher the learing prie would
be, all other things being equal. This eet needed to be taken into aount when solving
the basi alloation problem.
The simplied model used by ATTa-2001 assumed that the nth highest bid in a hotel
aution was roughly proportional to 
 n
(over the appropriate range of n) for some   1.
Thus, if the preditor gave a prie of p, ATTa-2001 only used this for purhasing two hotel
rooms (the \fair" share of a single agent of the 16 rooms), and adjusted pries for other
quantities of rooms by using .
For example, ATTa-2001 would onsider the ost of obtaining 4 rooms to be 4p
2
. One or
two rooms eah ost p, but 3 eah ost p, 4 eah ost p
2
, 5 eah ost p
3
, et. So in total, 2
rooms ost 2p, while 4 ost 4p
2
. The reasoning behind this proedure is that if ATTa-2001
buys two rooms | its fair share given that there are 16 rooms and 8 agents, then the 16th
highest bid (ATTa-2001's 2 bids in addition to 14 others) sets the prie. But if ATTa-2001
bids on an additional unit, the previous 15th highest bid beomes the prie-setting bid: the
prie for all rooms sold goes up from p to p.
The onstant  was alulated from the data of several hundred games during the seeding
round. In eah hotel aution, the ratio of the 14th and 18th highest bids (reeting the
226
Deision-Theoreti Bidding with Learned Density Models
most relevant range of n) was taken as an estimate of 
4
, and the (geometri) mean of the
resulting estimates was taken to obtain  = 1:35.
The LP alloator takes these prie estimates into aount when omputing G

by as-
signing higher osts to larger purhase volumes, thus tending to spread out ATTa-2001's
demand over the dierent hotel autions.
In ATTa-2001, a few heuristis were applied to the above proedure to improve stability
and to avoid pathologial behavior: pries below $1 were replaed by $1 in estimating ;
 = 1 was used for purhasing fewer than two hotel rooms; hotel rooms were divided into
early losing and late losing (and heap and expensive) ones, and the  values from the
orresponding subsets of autions of the seeding rounds were used in eah ase.
5.4 Hotel Expeted Marginal Values
Using the hotel prie predition module as desribed in Setion 4, oupled with a model of
its own eet on the eonomy, ATTa-2001 is equipped to determine its bids for hotel rooms.
Every minute, for eah hotel aution that is still open, ATTa-2001 assumes that aution
will lose next and omputes the marginal value of that hotel room given the predited
losing pries of the other rooms. If the aution does not lose next, then it assumes
that it will have a hane to revise its bids. Sine these predited pries are represented
as distributions of possible future pries, ATTa-2001 samples from these distributions and
averages the marginal values to obtain an expeted marginal value. Using the full minute
between losing times for omputation (or 30 seonds if there are still ights to onsider
too), ATTa-2001 divides the available time among the dierent open hotel autions and
generates as many prie samples as possible for eah hotel room. In the end, ATTa-2001
bids the expeted marginal values for eah of the rooms.
The algorithm is desribed preisely and with explanation in Table 7.
One additional ompliation regarding hotel autions is that, ontrary to one of our
assumptions in Setion 2.2 (Assumption 4), bids are not fully retratable: they an only
be hanged to $1 above the urrent ask prie. In the ase that there are urrent ative
bids for goods that ATTa-2001 no longer wants that are less than $1 above the urrent ask
prie, it may be advantageous to refrain from hanging the bid in the hopes that the ask
prie will surpass them: that is, the urrent bid may have a higher expeted value than
the best possible new bid. To address this issue, ATTa-2001 samples from the learned prie
distribution to nd the average expeted values of the urrent and potential bids, and only
enters a new bid in the ase that the potential bid is better.
5.5 Expeted Cost/Benet of Postponing Commitment
ATTa-2001 makes ight bidding deisions based on a ost-benet analysis: in partiular,
ATTa-2001 omputes the inremental ost of postponing bidding for a partiular ight versus
the value of delaying ommitment. In this setion, we desribe the determination of the
ost of postponing the bid.
Due to diÆulties that ompounded with more sophistiated approahes, ATTa-2001
used the following very simple model for estimating the prie of a ight tiket at a given
future time. It is evident from the formulation that|given y|the expeted prie inrease
from time 0 to time t was very nearly of the form Mt
2
for some M . It was also lear that
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 For eah hotel (in order of inreasing expeted prie):
 Repeat until time bound
1. Generate a random hotel losing order (only over open hotels)
2. Sample losing pries from predited hotel prie distributions
3. Given these losing pries, ompute V
0
; V
1
; : : : V
n
  V
i
 v(G

) if owning i of the hotel
  Estimate v(G

) with LP relaxation
  Assume that no additional hotel rooms of this type an be bought
  For other hotels, assume outstanding bids above sampled prie are already owned
(i.e., they annot be withdrawn).
  Note that V
0
 V
1
 : : :  V
n
: the values are monotonially inreasing sine having
more goods annot be worse in terms of possible alloations.
 The value of the ith opy of the room is the mean of V
i
  V
i 1
over all the samples.
 Note further that V
1
  V
0
 V
2
  V
1
: : :  V
n
  V
n 1
: the value dierenes are monotonially
dereasing sine eah additional room will be assigned to the lient who an derive the most
value from it.
 Bid for one room at the value of the ith opy of the room for all i suh that the value is
at least as muh as the urrent prie. Due to the monotoniity noted in the step above, no
matter what the losing prie, the desired number of rooms at that prie will be purhased.
Table 7: The algorithm for generating bids for hotel rooms.
as long as the prie did not hit the artiial boundaries at $150 and $800, the onstant M
must depend linearly on y 10. This linear dependene oeÆient was then estimated from
several hundred ight prie evolutions during the qualifying round. Thus, for this onstant
m, the expeted prie inrease from time t to time T was m(T
2
  t
2
)(y   10). When a
prie predition was needed, this formula was rst used for the rst and most reent atual
prie observations to obtain a guess for y, and then this y was used in the formula again to
estimate the future prie. No hange was predited if the formula yielded a prie derease.
This approah suers from systemi biases of various kinds (mainly due to the fat that
the variane of prie hanges gets relatively smaller over longer periods of time), but was
thought to be aurate enough for its use, whih was to predit whether or not the tiket
an be expeted to get signiantly more expensive over the next few minutes.
In pratie, during TAC-01, ATTa-2001 started with the ight-lookahead parameter set
to 3 (i.e., ost of postponing is the average of the predited ight osts 1, 2, and 3 minutes
in the future). However, this parameter was hanged to 2 by the end of the nals in order
to ause ATTa-2001 to delay its ight ommitments further.
5.5.1 Expeted Benefit of Postponing Commitment
Fundamentally, the benet of postponing ommitments to ights is that additional infor-
mation about the eventual hotel pries beomes known. Thus, the benet of postponing
ommitment is omputed by sampling possible future prie vetors and determining, on
average, how muh better the agent ould do if it bought a dierent ight instead of the
one in question. If it is optimal to buy the ight in all future senarios, then there is no
value in delaying the ommitment and the ight is purhased immediately. However, if
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there are many senarios in whih the ight is not the best one to get, the purhase is more
likely to be delayed.
The algorithm for determining the benet of postponing ommitment is similar to that
for determining the marginal value of hotel rooms. It is detailed, with explanation, in
Table 8.
 Assume we're onsidering buying n ights of a given type
 Repeat until time bound
1. Generate a random hotel losing order (open hotels)
2. Sample losing pries from predited prie distributions (open hotels)
3. Given these losing pries ompute V
0
; V
1
; : : : V
n
  V
i
= v(G

) if fored to buy i of the ight
  Estimate v(G

) with LP relaxation
  Assume more ights an be bought at the urrent prie
  Note that V
0
 V
1
 : : :  V
n
sine it is never worse to retain extra exibility.
 The value of waiting to buy opy i is the mean of V
i
  V
i 1
over all the samples. If
all prie samples lead to the onlusion that the ith ight should be bought, then
V
i
= V
i 1
and there is no benet to postponing ommitment.
Table 8: The algorithm for generating value of postponing ight ommitments.
5.6 Entertainment Expeted Values
The ore of ATTa-2001's entertainment-tiket-bidding strategy is again a alulation of the
expeted marginal values of eah tiket. For eah tiket, ATTa-2001 omputes the expeted
value of having one more and one fewer of the tiket. These alulations give bounds on the
bid and ask pries it is willing to post. The atual bid and ask pries are a linear funtion of
time remaining in the game: ATTa-2001 settles for a smaller and smaller prot from tiket
transations as the game goes on. Details of the funtions of bid and ask prie as a funtion
of game time and tiket value remained unhanged from ATTa-2000 (Stone et al., 2001).
Details of the entertainment-tiket expeted marginal utility alulations are given in
Table 9.
6. Results
This setion presents empirial results demonstrating the eetiveness of the ATTa-2001
strategy. First, we summarize its performane in the 2001 and 2002 Trading Agent Com-
petitions (TACs). These summaries provide evidene of the strategy's overall eetiveness,
but, due to the small number of games in the ompetitions, are anedotal rather than si-
entially onlusive. We then present ontrolled experiments that provide more onlusive
evidene of the utility of our deision theoreti and learning approahes embedded within
ATTa-2001.
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 Assume n of a given tiket type are urrently owned
 Repeat until time bound
1. Generate a random hotel losing order (open hotels)
2. Sample losing pries from predited prie distributions (open hotels)
3. Given these losing pries ompute V
n 1
; V
n
; V
n+1
  V
i
= v(G

) if own i of the tiket
  Estimate v(G

) with LP relaxation
  Assume no other tikets an be bought or sold
  Note that V
n 1
 V
n
 V
n+1
sine it is never worse to own extra tikets.
 The value of buying a tiket is the mean of V
n+1
  V
n
over all the samples; the value
of selling is the mean of V
n
  V
n 1
.
 Sine tikets are onsidered sequentially, if the determined buy or sell bid leads to a
prie that would lear aording to the urrent quotes, assume the transation goes
through before omputing the values of buying and selling other tiket types.
Table 9: The algorithm for generating value of entertainment tikets.
6.1 TAC-01 Competition
Of the 19 teams that entered the qualifying round, ATTa-2001 was one of eight agents
to make it to the nals on the afternoon of Otober 14th, 2001. The nals onsisted of
24 games among the same eight agents. Right from the beginning, it beame lear that
livingagents (Fritshi & Dorer, 2002) was the team to beat in the nals. They jumped to an
early lead in the rst two games, and by eight games into the round, they were more than
135 points per game ahead of their losest ompetitor (SouthamptonTAC, He & Jennings,
2002). 16 games into the round, they were more than 250 points ahead of their two losest
ompetitors (ATTa-2001 and whitebear).
From that point, ATTa-2001, whih was ontinually retraining its prie preditors based
on reent games, began making a omebak. By the time the last game was to be played,
it was only an average of 22 points per game behind livingagents. It thus needed to beat
livingagents by 514 points in the nal game to overtake it, well within the margins observed
in individual game instanes. As the game ompleted, ATTa-2001's sore of 3979 was one
of the rst sores to be posted by the server. The other agents' sores were reported one
by one, until only the livingagents sore was left. After agonizing seonds (at least for us),
the TAC server posted a nal game sore of 4626, resulting in a win for livingagents.
After the ompetition, the TAC team at the University of Mihigan onduted a regres-
sion analysis of the eets of the lient proles on agent sores. Using data from the seeding
rounds, it was determined that agents did better when their lients had:
1. fewer total preferred travel days;
2. higher total entertainment values; and
3. a higher ratio of outer days (1 and 4) to inner (2 and 3) in preferred trip intervals.
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Based on these signiant measures, the games in the nals ould be handiapped based
on eah agents' aggregate lient proles. Doing so indiated that livingagents' lients were
muh easier to satisfy than those of ATTa-2001, giving ATTa-2001 the highest handiapped
sore. The nal sores, as well as the handiapped sores, are shown in Table 10. Complete
results and aÆliations are available from http://ta.ees.umih.edu.
Agent Mean Handiapped sore
ATTa-2001 3622 4154
livingagents 3670 4094
whitebear 3513 3931
Urlaub01 3421 3909
Retsina 3352 3812
CaiserSose 3074 3766
SouthamptonTAC 3253 3679
TasMan 2859 3338
Table 10: Sores during the nals. Eah agent played 24 games. Southampton's sore was
adversely aeted by a game in whih their agent rashed after buying many
ights but no hotels, leading to a loss of over 3000 points. Disarding that game
results in an average sore of 3531.
6.2 TAC-02 Competition
A year after the TAC-01 ompetition, ATTa-2001 was re-entered in the TAC-02 ompetition
using the models trained at the end of TAC-01. Speially, the prie preditors were left
unhanged throughout (no learning). The seeding round inluded 19 agents, eah playing
440 games over the ourse of about 2 weeks. ATTa-2001 was the top-soring agent in this
round, as shown in Table 11. Sores in the seeding round were weighted so as to emphasize
later results over earlier results: sores on day n of the seeding round were given a weight
of n. This pratie was designed to enourage experimentation early in the round. The
oÆial ranking in the ompetitions was based on the mean sore after ignoring eah agent's
worst 10 results so as to allow for oasional program rashes and network problems.
On the one hand, it is striking that ATTa-2001 was able to nish so strongly in a eld
of agents that had presumably improved over the ourse of the year. On the other hand,
most agents were being tuned, for better and for worse, while ATTa-2001 was onsistent
throughout. In partiular, we are told that SouthamptonTAC experimented with its approah
during the later days of the round, perhaps ausing it to fall out of the lead (by weighted
sore) in the end. During the 14-game seminal heat, ATTa-2001, whih was now restored
with its learning apability and retrained over the data from the 2002 seeding round, nished
6th out of 8 thereby failing to reah the nals.
There are a number of possible reasons for this sudden failure. One relatively mun-
dane explanation is that the agent had to hange omputational environments between the
seeding rounds and the nals, and there may have been a bug or omputational resoure
onstraint introdued. Another possibility is that due to the small number of games in
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Agent Mean Weighted, dropped worst 10
ATTa-2001 3050 3131
SouthamptonTAC 3100 3129
UMBCTAC 2980 3118
livingagents 3018 3091
uhk 2998 3055
Thalis 2952 3000
whitebear 2945 2966
RoxyBot 2738 2855
Table 11: Top 8 sores during the seeding round of TAC-02. Eah agent played 440 games,
with its worst 10 games ignored when omputing the rankings.
the seminals, ATTa-2001 simply got unluky with respet to lients and the interation
of opponent strategies. However, it is also plausible that the training data from the 2002
qualifying and seeding round data was less representative of the 2002 nals than the was the
training data from 2001; and/or that the ompeting agents improved signiantly over the
seeding round while ATTa-2001 remained unhanged. The TAC team at the University of
Mihigan has done a study of the prie preditors of several 2002 TAC agents that suggests
that the bug hypothesis is most plausible: the ATTa-2001 preditor from 2001 outperforms
all other preditors from 2002 on the data from the 2002 seminals and nals; and one other
agent that uses the 2002 data did produe good preditions based on that data (Wellman,
Reeves, Lohner, & Vorobeyhik, 2003b).
8
6.3 Controlled Experiments
ATTa-2001's suess in the TAC-01 ompetition demonstrates its eetiveness as a omplete
system. However, sine the ompeting agents diered along several dimensions, the ompe-
tition results annot isolate the suessful approahes. In this setion, we report ontrolled
experiments designed to test the eÆay of ATTa-2001's mahine-learning approah to prie
predition.
6.3.1 Varying the Preditor
In the rst set of experiments, we attempted to determine how the quality of ATTa-2001's
hotel prie preditions aets its performane. To this end, we devised seven prie predition
shemes, varying onsiderably in sophistiation and inspired by approahes taken by other
TAC ompetitors, and inorporated these shemes into our agent. We then played these
seven agents against one another repeatedly, with regular retraining as desribed below.
Following are the seven hotel predition shemes that we used, in dereasing order of
sophistiation:
8. Indeed, in the TAC-03 ompetition, ATTa-2001 was entered using the trained models from 2001, and it
won the ompetition, suggesting further that the failure in 2002 was due to a problem with the learned
models that were used during the nals in 2002.
232
Deision-Theoreti Bidding with Learned Density Models
 ATTa-2001
s
: This is the \full-strength" agent based on boosting that was used during
the tournament. (The s denotes sampling.)
 Cond'lMean
s
: This agent samples pries from the empirial distribution of pries from
previously played games, onditioned only on the losing time of the hotel room (a
subset of of the features used by ATTa-2001
s
). In other words, it ollets all historial
hotel pries and breaks them down by the time at whih the hotel losed (as well as
room type, as usual). The prie preditor then simply samples from the olletion of
pries orresponding to the given losing time.
 SimpleMean
s
: This agent samples pries from the empirial distribution of pries from
previously played games, without regard to the losing time of the hotel room (but
still broken down by room type). It uses a subset of the features used by Cond'lMean
s
.
 ATTa-2001
ev
, Cond'lMean
ev
, SimpleMean
ev
: These agents predit in the same way as
their orresponding preditors above, but instead of returning a random sample from
the estimated distribution of hotel pries, they deterministially return the expeted
value of the distribution. (The ev denotes expeted value, as introdued in Se-
tion 2.1.)
 CurrentBid: This agent uses a very simple preditor that always predits that the hotel
room will lose at its urrent prie.
In every ase, whenever the prie preditor returns a prie that is below the urrent prie,
we replae it with the urrent prie (sine pries annot go down).
In our experiments, we added as an eighth agent EarlyBidder, inspired by the livingagents
agent. EarlyBidder used SimpleMean
ev
to predit losing pries, determined an optimal set of
purhases, and then plaed bids for these goods at suÆiently high pries to ensure that
they would be purhased ($1001 for all hotel rooms, just as livingagents did in TAC-01) right
after the rst ight quotes. It then never revised these bids.
Eah of these agents require training, i.e., data from previously played games. However,
we are faed with a sort of \hiken and egg" problem: to run the agents, we need to
rst train the agents using data from games in whih they were involved, but to get this
kind of data, we need to rst run the agents. To get around this problem, we ran the
agents in phases. In Phase I, whih onsisted of 126 games, we used training data from
the seeding, seminals and nals rounds of TAC-01. In Phase II, lasting 157 games, we
retrained the agents one every six hours using all of the data from the seeding, seminals
and nals rounds as well as all of the games played in Phase II. Finally, in Phase III, lasting
622 games, we ontinued to retrain the agents one every six hours, but now using only
data from games played during Phases I and II, and not inluding data from the seeding,
seminals and nals rounds.
Table 12 shows how the agents performed in eah of these phases. Muh of what we
observe in this table is onsistent with our expetations. The more sophistiated boosting-
based agents (ATTa-2001
s
and ATTa-2001
ev
) learly dominated the agents based on simpler
predition shemes. Moreover, with ontinued training, these agents improved markedly
relative to EarlyBidder. We also see the performane of the simplest agent, CurrentBid, whih
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Agent Relative Sore
Phase I Phase II Phase III
ATTa-2001
ev
105:2 49:5 (2) 131:6 47:7 (2) 166:2 20:8 (1)
ATTa-2001
s
27:8 42:1 (3) 86:1 44:7 (3) 122:3 19:4 (2)
EarlyBidder 140:3 38:6 (1) 152:8 43:4 (1) 117:0 18:0 (3)
SimpleMean
ev
 28:8 45:1 (5)  53:9 40:1 (5)  11:5 21:7 (4)
SimpleMean
s
 72:0 47:5 (7)  71:6 42:8 (6)  44:1 18:2 (5)
Cond'lMean
ev
8:6 41:2 (4) 3:5 37:5 (4)  60:1 19:7 (6)
Cond'lMean
s
 147:5 35:6 (8)  91:4 41:9 (7)  91:1 17:6 (7)
CurrentBid  33:7 52:4 (6)  157:1 54:8 (8)  198:8 26:0 (8)
Table 12: The average relative sores ( standard deviation) for eight agents in the three
phases of our ontrolled experiment in whih the hotel predition algorithm was
varied. The relative sore of an agent is its sore minus the average sore of all
agents in that game. The agent's rank within eah phase is shown in parentheses.
does not employ any kind of training, signiantly deline relative to the other data-driven
agents.
On the other hand, there are some phenomena in this table that were very surprising
to us. Most surprising was the failure of sampling to help. Our strategy relies heavily
not only on estimating hotel pries, but also taking samples from the distribution of hotel
pries. Yet these results indiate that using expeted hotel prie, rather than prie samples,
onsistently performs better. We speulate that this may be beause an insuÆient number
of samples are being used (due to omputational limitations) so that the numbers derived
from these samples have too high a variane. Another possibility is that the method of using
samples to estimate sores onsistently overestimates the expeted sore beause it assumes
the agent an behave with perfet knowledge for eah individual sample|a property of our
approximation sheme. Finally, as our algorithm uses sampling at several dierent points
(omputing hotel expeted values, deiding when to buy ights, priing entertainment tik-
ets, et.), it is quite possible that sampling is beneial for some deisions while detrimental
for others. For example, when diretly omparing versions of the algorithm with sampling
used at only subsets of the deision points, the data suggests that sampling for the hotel
deisions is most beneial, while sampling for the ights and entertainment tikets is neu-
tral at best, and possibly detrimental. This result is not surprising given that the sampling
approah is motivated primarily by the task of bidding for hotels.
We were also surprised that Cond'lMean
s
and Cond'lMean
ev
eventually performed worse
than the less sophistiated SimpleMean
s
and SimpleMean
ev
. One possible explanation is that
the simpler model happens to give preditions that are just as good as the more ompliated
model, perhaps beause losing time is not terribly informative, or perhaps beause the
adjustment to prie based on urrent prie is more signiant. Other things being equal,
the simpler model has the advantage that its statistis are based on all of the prie data,
regardless of losing time, whereas the onditional model makes eah predition based on
only an eighth of the data (sine there are eight possible losing times, eah equally likely).
In addition to agent performane, it is possible to measure the inauray of the eventual
preditions, at least for the non-sampling agents. For these agents, we measured the root
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mean squared error of the preditions made in Phase III. These were: 56.0 for ATTa-2001
ev
,
66.6 for SimpleMean
ev
, 69.8 for CurrentBid and 71.3 for Cond'lMean
ev
. Thus, we see that
the lower the error of the preditions (aording to this measure), the higher the sore
(orrelation R =  0:88).
6.3.2 ATTa-2001 vs. EarlyBidder
In a sense, the two agents that nished at the top of the standings in TAC-01 represented
opposite ends of a spetrum. The livingagents agent uses a simple open-loop strategy, om-
mitting to a set of desired goods right at the beginning of the game, while ATTa-2001 uses
a losed-loop, adaptive strategy.
The open-loop strategy relies on the other agents to stabilize the eonomy and reate
onsistent nal pries. In partiular, if all eight agents are open loop and plae very high
bids for the goods they want, many of the pries will skyroket, evaporating any potential
prot. Thus, a set of open-loop agents would tend to get negative sores|the open-loop
strategy is a parasite, in a manner of speaking. Table 13 shows the results of running 27
games with 7 opies of the open-loop EarlyBidder and one of ATTa-2001. Although motivated
by livingagents, in atuality it is idential to ATTa-2001 exept that it uses SimpleMean
ev
and
it plaes all of its ight and hotel bids immediately after the rst ight quotes. It bids
only for the hotels that appear in G

at that time. All hotel bids are for $1001. In the
experiments, one opy of ATTa-2001
s
is inluded for omparison. The prie preditors are
all from Phase I in the preeding experiments. EarlyBidder's high bidding strategy bakres
and it ends up overpaying signiantly for its goods. As our experiments above indiate,
ATTa-2001 may improve even further if it is allowed to train on the games of the on-going
experiment as well.
Agent Sore Utility
ATTa-2001 2431  464 8909  264
EarlyBidder(7)  4880  337 9870  34
Table 13: The results of running ATTa-2001 against 7 opies of EarlyBidder over the ourse
of 27 games. EarlyBidder ahieves high utility, but overpays signiantly, resulting
in low sores.
The open-loop strategy has the advantage of buying a minimal set of goods. That is, it
never buys more than it an use. On the other hand, it is suseptible to unexpeted pries
in that it an get stuk paying arbitrarily high pries for the hotel rooms it has deided to
buy.
Notie in Table 13 that the average utility of the EarlyBidder's lients is signiantly
greater than that of ATTa-2001's lients. Thus, the dierene in sore is aounted for
entirely by the ost of the goods. EarlyBidder ends up paying exorbitant pries, while ATTa-
2001 generally steers lear of the more expensive hotels. Its lients' utility suers, but the
ost-savings are well worth it.
Compared to the open-loop strategy, ATTa-2001's strategy is relatively stable against
itself. Its main drawbak is that as it hanges its deision about what goods it wants and as
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it may also buy goods to hedge against possible prie hanges, it an end up getting stuk
paying for some goods that are ultimately useless to any of its lients.
Table 14 shows the results of 7 opies of ATTa-2001 playing against eah other and
one opy of the EarlyBidder. Again, training is from the seeding round and nals of TAC-
01: the agents don't adapt during the experiment. Inluded in this experiment are three
variants of ATTa-2001, eah with a dierent ight-lookahead parameter (from the setion
on \ost of postponing ight ommitments"). There were three opies eah of the agents
with ight-lookahead set to 2 and 3 (ATTa-2001(2) and ATTa-2001(3), respetively), and
one ATTa-2001 agent with ight-lookahead set to 4 (ATTa-2001(4)).
Agent Sore Utility
EarlyBidder 2869  69 10079  55
ATTa-2001(2) 2614  38 9671  32
ATTa-2001(3) 2570  39 9641  32
ATTa-2001(4) 2494  68 9613  55
Table 14: The results of running the EarlyBidder against 7 opies of ATTa-2001 over the
ourse of 197 games. The three dierent versions of ATTa-2001 had slightly
dierent ight-lookaheads.
From the results in Table 14 it is lear that ATTa-2001 does better when ommitting
to its ight purhases later in the game (ATTa-2001(2) as opposed to ATTa-2001(4)). In
omparison with Table 13, the eonomy represented here does signiantly better overall.
That is, having many opies of ATTa-2001 in the eonomy does not ause them to suer.
However, in this eonomy, EarlyBidder is able to invade. It gets a signiantly higher utility
for its lients and only pays slightly more than the ATTa-2001 agents (as omputed by
utility minus sore).
9
The results in this setion suggest that the variane of the losing pries is the largest
determining fator between the eetiveness of the two strategies (assuming nobody else
is using the open-loop strategy). We speulate that with large prie varianes, the losed-
loop strategy (ATTa-2001) should do better, but with small prie varianes, the open-loop
strategy ould do better.
7. Disussion
The open-loop and losed-loop strategies of the previous setion dier in their handling of
prie utuation. A fundamental way of taking prie utuation into aount is to plae
\safe bids." A very high bid exposes an agent to the danger of buying something at a
ridiulously high prie. If pries are in fat stable then high bids are safe. But if pries
utuate, then high bids, suh as the bids of the stable-prie strategy, are risky. In TAC,
hotel rooms are sold in a Vikrey-style nth prie ation. There is a separate aution for
eah day of eah hotel and these autions are done sequentially. Although the order of the
autions is randomized, and not known to the agent, when plaing bids in one of these
9. We suspet that were the agents allowed to retrain over the ourse of the experiments, ATTa-2001
would end up improving, as we saw in Phase III of the previous set of experiments. Were this to our,
it is possible that EarlyBidder would no longer be able to invade.
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autions the agent assumes that aution will lose next. We assumed in the design of our
agent that our bids in one aution do not aet pries in other autions. This assumption
is not stritly true, but in a large eonomy one expets that the bids of a single individual
have a limited eet on pries. Furthermore, the prie most aeted by a bid is the prie
of the item being bid on; the eet on other autions seems less diret and perhaps more
limited. Assuming bids in one aution do not aet pries in another, the optimal bidding
strategy is the standard strategy for a Vikrey aution|the bid for an item should be equal
to its utility to the bidder. So, to plae a Vikrey-optimal bid, one must be able to estimate
the utility of an item. The utility of owning an item is simply the expeted nal sore
assuming one owns the item minus the expeted nal sore assuming one does not own the
item. So, the problem of omputing a Vikrey-optimal bid an be redued to the problem
of prediting nal sores for two alternative game situations. We use two sore predition
proedures, whih we all the stable-prie sore preditor (orresponding to Equation 5)
and the unstable-prie sore preditor (Equation 4).
The Stable-Prie Sore Preditor. The stable-prie sore preditor rst estimates
the expeted pries in the rest of the game using whatever information is available in the
given game situation. It then omputes the value ahieved by optimal purhases under the
estimated pries. In an eonomy with stable pries, this estimate will be quite aurate|
if we make the optimal purhases for the expeted prie then, if the pries are near our
estimates, our performane will also be near the estimated value.
The Unstable-Prie Sore Preditor. Stable-prie sore predition does not take
into aount the ability of the agent to reat to hanges in prie as the game progresses. Sup-
pose a given room is often heap but is sometimes expensive. If the agent an rst determine
the prie of the room, and then plan for that prie, the agent will do better than guessing
the prie ahead of time and stiking to the purhases ditated by that prie. The unstable
prie preditor uses a model of the distribution of possible pries. It repeatedly samples
pries from this distribution, omputes the stable-prie sore predition under the sampled
prie, and then takes the average of these stable-prie sores over the various prie samples.
This sore predition algorithm is similar to the algorithm used in Ginsberg's (2001) quite
suessful omputer bridge program where the sore is predited by sampling the possible
hands of the opponent and, for eah sample, omputing the sore of optimal play in the ase
where all players have omplete information (double dummy play). While this approah
has a simple intuitive motivation, it is learly imperfet. The unstable-prie sore preditor
assumes both that future deisions are made in the presene of omplete prie information,
and that the agent is free to hange existing bids in autions that have not yet losed. Both
of these assumptions are only approximately true at best. Ways of ompensating for the
imperfetions in sore predition were desribed in Setion 5.
Buy Now or Deide Later. The trading agent must deide what airline tikets to buy
and when to buy them. In deiding whether to buy an airline tiket, the agent an ompare
the predited sore in the situation where it owns the airline tiket with the predited sore
in the situation where it does not own the airline tiket but may buy it later. Airline tikets
tend to inrease in prie, so if the agent knows that a ertain tiket is needed it should buy
it as soon as possible. But whether or not a given tiket is desirable may depend on the
prie of hotel rooms, whih may beome learer as the game progresses. If airline tikets
did not inrease in prie, as was the ase in TAC-00, then they should be bought at the
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last possible moment (Stone et al., 2001). To determine whether an airline tiket should be
bought now or not, one an ompare the predited sore in the situation where one has just
bought the tiket at its urrent prie with the predited sore in the situation where the
prie of the tiket is somewhat higher but has not yet been bought. It is interesting to note
that if one uses the stable-prie sore preditor for both of these preditions, and the tiket
is purhased in the optimal alloation under the urrent prie estimate, then the predited
sore for buying the tiket now will always be higher|inreasing the prie of the tiket an
only redue the sore. However, the unstable-prie sore preditor an yield an advantage
for delaying the purhase. This advantage omes from the fat that buying the tiket may
be optimal under some pries but not optimal under others. If the tiket has not yet been
bought, then the sore will be higher for those sampled pries where the tiket should not
be bought. This orresponds to the intuition that in ertain ases the purhase should be
delayed until more information is available.
Our guiding priniple in the design of the agent was, to the greatest extent possible, to
have the agent analytially alulate optimal ations. A key omponent of these alulations
is the sore preditor, based either on a single estimated assignment of pries or on a model of
the probability distribution over assignments of pries. Both sore preditors, though learly
imperfet, seem useful. Of these two preditors, only the unstable-prie preditor an be
used to quantitatively estimate the value of postponing a deision until more information is
available. The auray of prie estimation is learly of entral importane. Future researh
will undoubtedly fous on ways of improving both prie modeling and sore predition based
on prie modeling.
8. Related and Future Work
Although there has been a good deal of researh on aution theory, espeially from the
perspetive of aution mehanisms (Klemperer, 1999), studies of autonomous bidding agents
and their interations are relatively few and reent. TAC is one example. FM97.6 is
another aution test-bed, whih is based on shmarket autions (Rodriguez-Aguilar, Martin,
Noriega, Garia, & Sierra, 1998). Automati bidding agents have also been reated in this
domain (Gimenez-Funes, Godo, Rodriguez-Aguiolar, & Garia-Calves, 1998). There have
been a number of studies of agents bidding for a single good in multiple autions (Ito,
Fukuta, Shintani, & Syara, 2000; Anthony, Hall, Dang, & Jennings, 2001; Preist, Bartolini,
& Phillips, 2001).
A notable aution-based ompetition that was held prior to TAC was the Santa Fe
Double Aution Tournament (Rust, Miller, & Palmer, 1992). This aution involved several
agents ompeting in a single ontinuous double aution similar to the TAC entertainment
tiket autions. As analyzed by Tesauro and Das (2001), this tournament was won by a
parasite strategy that, like livingagents as desribed in Setion 6.3, relied on other agents to
nd a stable prie and then took advantage of it to gain an advantage. In that ase, the
advantage was gained by waiting until the last minute to bid, a strategy ommonly known
as sniping.
TAC-01 was the seond iteration of the Trading Agent Competition. The rules of TAC-
01 are largely idential to those of TAC-00, with three important exeptions:
1. In TAC-00, ight pries did not tend to inrease;
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2. In TAC-00, hotel autions usually all losed at the end of the game;
3. In TAC-00, entertainment tikets were distributed uniformly to all agents
While minor on the surfae, the dierenes signiantly enrihed the strategi omplexity
of the game. In TAC-00, most of the designers disovered that a dominant strategy was
to defer all serious bidding to the end of the game. A result, the fous was on solving
the alloation problem, with most agents using a greedy, heuristi approah. Sine the
hotel autions losed at the end of the game, timing issues were also important, with
signiant advantages going to agents that were able to bid in response to last-seond prie
quotes (Stone & Greenwald, 2003). Nonetheless, many tehniques developed in 2000 were
relevant to the 2001 ompetition: the agent strategies put forth in TAC-00 were important
preursors to the seond year's eld, for instane as pointed out in Setion 5.1.
Prediting hotel learing pries was perhaps the most interesting aspet of TAC agent
strategies in TAC-01, espeially in relation to TAC-00 where the last-minute bidding reated
essentially a sealed-bid aution. As indiated by our experiments desribed in Setion 6.3,
there are many possible approahes to this hotel prie estimation problem, and the approah
hosen an have a signiant impat on the agent's performane. Among those observed
in TAC-01 are the following (Wellman, Greenwald, Stone, & Wurman, 2002), assoiated in
some ases with the prie-preditor variant in our experiments that was motivated by it.
1. Just use the urrent prie quote p
t
(CurrentBid).
2. Adjust based on histori data. For example, if 
t
is the average historial dierene
between learing prie and prie at time t, then the predited learing prie is p
t
+
t
.
3. Predit by tting a urve to the sequene of ask pries seen in the urrent game.
4. Predit based on losing prie data for that hotel in past games (SimpleMean
ev
, SimpleMean
s
).
5. Same as above, but ondition on hotel losing time, reognizing that the losing
sequene will inuene the relative pries.
6. Same as above, but ondition on full ordering of hotel losings, or whih hotels are
open or losed at a partiular point (Cond'lMean
ev
, Cond'lMean
s
).
7. Learn a mapping from features of the urrent game (inluding urrent pries) to losing
pries based on histori data (ATTa-2001
s
, ATTa-2001
ev
).
8. Hand-onstrut rules based on observations about assoiations between abstrat fea-
tures.
Having demonstrated ATTa-2001's suess at bidding in simultaneous autions for mul-
tiple interating goods in the TAC domain, we extended our approah to apply it to the
U.S. Federal Communiations Commission (FCC) spetrum autions domain (Weber, 1997).
The FCC holds spetrum autions to sell radio bandwidth to teleommuniations ompa-
nies. Lienses entitle their owners to use a speied radio spetrum band within a speied
geographial area, or market. Typially several lienses are autioned o simultaneously
with bidders plaing independent bids for eah liense. The most reent aution brought in
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over $16 billion dollars. In a detailed simulation of this domain (Csirik, Littman, Singh, &
Stone, 2001), we disovered a novel, suessful bidding strategy in this domain that allows
the bidders to inrease their prots signiantly over a reasonable default strategy (Reitsma,
Stone, Csirik, & Littman, 2002).
Our ongoing researh agenda inludes applying our approah to other similar domains.
We partiularly expet the boosting approah to prie predition and the deision-theoreti
reasoning over prie distributions to transfer to other domains. Other andidate real-world
domains inlude eletriity autions, supply hains, and perhaps even travel booking on
publi e-ommere sites.
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